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ABSTRACT 
Civil Society and Democracy in Former Yugoslavian Countries  
 
 
Reagan Spexarth 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Ruchan Kaya 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
This project addresses the impact of civil society on the quality of democracies in former 
Yugoslavian countries. Many of these new republics have witnessed some degree of democratic 
backsliding in the last twenty years. However, current comparative politics research has pointed 
to the presence of a strong civil society as a potential preventative mechanism for returns to 
authoritarian norms. This paper uses the Varieties of Democracy dataset to quantitatively test the 
correlative relationship between civil society and democratic backsliding in former Yugoslavian 
countries. We allude to larger research questions and the need for more quantitative explorations 
of these topics in comparative politics.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Scholarly, the term “civil society” refers to all voluntary associations. This can include 
but is not limited to, participation in social movements, politics, business, church, extra-
curricular activities, Boy Scouts, and even bowling leagues.  
The early nineties saw an emergence of the most notable works in the civil society 
subfield, particularly Putnam’s Bowling Alone. This work described the declining state of 
American civil society and posited a link between a strong civil society and macro development 
goals such as democratization. Putnam also claimed that social capital, measured by civil society 
programs, connected collective action and economic development (1995).  
After Putnam, other studies attempted to connect the size of civil societies in a country to 
its level of democracy and economic well-being. In current scholarly literature, a strong civil 
society is seen as inseparable from a strong democracy. These findings were used by western 
countries and the UN as a reason to invest heavily in supporting and propping up NGOs in 
developing countries to support development outcomes (Scholte 2002; Shelley 1997).  
Since Putnam, many scholars started challenging the legitimacy and strength of the tie 
between civil society and democracy, calling civil society a double-edged sword that can both 
help and hurt democracy (Foley and Edwards 1996). Others show that it is the quality of a civil 
society that matters more than the sheer number of NGOs or other organizations (Woolcock 
2011; Cohen and Arato 1997; Shelley 1997). Scholars such as Francis Fukuyama and Jan 
Scholte argue that other metrics, such as trust and representativeness, are the most important 
when looking at how civil society shapes democratization and economic development 
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(Fukuyama 1995; Scholte 2002). Here, democratic outcomes of civil society balance of views, 
external and internal checks, individual attachments, and the distribution of attachments all serve 
as model indicators for “positive” democratic outcomes (Warren 2011).  
Cases of transition from autocracy to democracy can often be filled with perils of 
democratic backsliding and authoritarian return. After the cold war, many nations experienced 
abrupt regime change, transitioning from communist regimes to fledgling democratic 
governments. After these democratic transitions, many countries were thought to be moving 
towards stable democracy. But while some nations became full-fledged democracies, most 
become ruled by hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002). Many of these hybrid regimes have 
been coined “competitive authoritarian regimes,” or regimes with formal democratic institutions 
that are abused by a single party or government. To explain these varying levels of 
democratization in each state, Levitsky and Way came up with a theory of leverage and linkage.  
The theorists define leverage as an “authoritarian governments’ vulnerability to external 
democratizing pressure” (Levitsky and Way 2005, 21). There are three main factors behind this 
vulnerability: state size, military presence, and economic strength; competing foreign policy 
agendas; and linkage to an alternative power. The more leverage Western powers have over a 
state, the more costly it is for that state to pursue authoritarian policies. However, Levitsky and 
Way show that this leverage is a blunt tool that did not allow for nuanced and lasting policy 
change.  
Most democratic transitions do not occur due to massive mobilization efforts. Rather, as 
seen in many of the Eastern Europe democratic transitions, they often occur after a period of 
prolonged negotiation (Diamond 1994). While civil society was not the sole cause of 
democratization efforts in these countries, it had a crucial impact on their respective regime 
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transitions. Civil society acts a check on state power and authority and can act as a legitimizing 
factor for democracy by enabling and elevating minority groups and giving them a voice that 
they might not have previously had in the political sphere. For civil society to aid 
democratization, organizations must have open methods and democratic goals. 
Institutionalization, democratic character, pluralism (without fracturing), and denseness are all 
additional factors that lead civil society to have an impact on democratic outcomes in a state. All 
these factors serve to offer citizens choice and representation within civil society. However, there 
are limits to the ability of civil society acting as a democratizing force.  
Because of such limits, scholars such as Nacy Bermeo and Marcus Mietzner have started 
to look at civil society as a defensive force, rather than an offensive one. That is, instead of 
looking at the ability of civil society to spur a democratic transition, they have begun to look at 
the ability of civil society to help maintain democracy in places where it already exists. Nancy 
Bermeo shows the ability of civil society to enable counter mobilization efforts against 
democratic backsliding (2016). Bermeo uses Latin American examples in her paper, showing 
how recent mass counter-mobilizations paired with changed economic conditions have allowed 
for reversals to democratic backsliding in Venezuela and Ecuador.  
This reversing of authoritarian norms can also be seen in Indonesia. Looking at the 
stagnating democratic consolidation of Indonesia, Marcus Mietzner shows the role civil society 
may play in safeguarding democracy (Mietzner 2012).  Indonesia was once considered to be an 
exception to the “democratic recession” of the late 2000s by academics but has since started to 
backslide. He posits that Indonesian civil society has been successful in resisting additional elite 
led democratic backsliding. When elites tried to take control and push for anti-democratic 
measures, civil society groups and the media were outraged (Mietzner 2012). NGOs used experts 
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to argue against the autocratic reforms and their potential democratic erasure. Some NGOs 
organized leaflets and led public campaigns against the reforms. The media also argued against 
the reforms and used opinion polls to amplify the complaints of the citizenry, clearly 
demonstrating the defensive capability of Indonesian civil society. 
This project seeks to address the impact of civil society on the quality of democracies in 
post-communist Eastern Europe. Recently, many of these countries have witnessed some degree 
of democratic backsliding. However, the presence of a strong civil society may help prevent new 
backsliding and allow for countermobilization and pushback against the backsliding that has 
already occurred. This paper will be looking directly at the relationship between civil society and 
democratic backsliding in post-communist Eastern Europe in order to test the defensive and 
stabilizing capacities of civil society. If this theory holds, then there should be increasing levels 
of liberal democracy detected alongside higher levels of civil society participation.    
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
This project analyzes the effect of civil society strength on democratic outcomes. Both 
the level of liberal democracy and the level of civil society participation will be studied in order 
to quantitatively test the theory that civil society can limit democratic backsliding. In order to test 
this hypothesis, specifically, that decreasing levels of democratic backsliding will occur among 
countries with stronger, more active civil societies, I make use of the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) dataset. The V-Dem dataset is a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset that uses 
measures beyond electoral presence in order to measure democracy (Coppedge et al. 2016). The 
dataset has five different democratic indices, each of which reflect a different aspect of 
democracy. The democratic indices are: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and 
egalitarian. This project looks at the liberal democracy index, which measures the limits placed 
on government power as well as the protection of individual and minority rights from state 
infringement. This is measured by the level of electoral democracy, as well as legal minority 
rights protections, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on the 
executive (Coppedge et al. 2016).   
As with the democratic indices the second variable in this project utilizes the V-Dem 
dataset, this time employing the Civil Society Participation Index. This index seeks to “provide a 
measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in 
which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.” 
(Coppedge et al. 2016). This is measured by aggregating local and national candidate selection, 
civil society organization consultation, civil society participatory environment, and women’s 
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participation in civil society. This project will compare these two indices in order to 
quantitatively measure the effect of civil society participation on democratic outcomes.    
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows the classification system and values for given V-Dem civil society and 
liberal democracy indices. The different classification ranges are derived from the 0-1 scale the 
indices are based off as well as the average values of sample countries. The values themselves 
are based on the average of each index over a given time period.   
Table 1. Classification values for indices.  
Classification Civil Society Participation Index Liberal Democracy Index 
High >0.75 >0.75 
Medium High 0.60-0.75 0.60-0.75 
Medium 0.40-0.60 0.40-0.60 
Medium Low 0.25-0.40 0.25-0.40 
Low <0.25 <0.25 
 
The two tables below show the resulting classifications for Eastern European countries 
over two time periods. The first shows Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia from 1995-
2005. Albania officially emerged from Communism in 1992, when it held its first democratic 
elections. Croatia and Macedonia left Yugoslavia in 2001, with Bosnia following soon after in 
2002. 
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Table 2. Explaining variation in democratic outcomes according to civil society strength in 
Eastern Europe from 1995-2005.  
Country Civil Society Participation Liberal Democracy 
Macedonia Medium Medium 
Albania Medium Medium Low 
Bosnia Medium Low 
Croatia Medium High Medium Low 
 
Looking at Table 2, it is difficult to draw a strong conclusion on the relationship between 
civil society participation and liberal democracy. Macedonia shows a strong correlation between 
its liberal democracy and civil society participation, given the fact that both variables averaged 
the same “Medium” rating over the course of the ten-year period. Albania is less conclusive, 
with liberal democracy trailing the level of civil society participation by a single rank. 
Meanwhile, Bosnia and Croatia both have a liberal democracy classification two levels below 
that of their civil society participation.  
It is worth noting the relatively chaotic circumstances surrounding these countries during 
this period of classification. In 1995, Bosnia was engulfed in the Bosnian War, which did not end 
until the ceasefire on December 14 of that same year. Additionally, many of these countries were 
within the first few years of their democracies in 1995 and were only just starting to develop 
their governing institutions. Furthermore, as ex-communist countries, organized civil society was 
also a new development. Under communism, many organizations and groups were either 
forcefully limited in their scope and actions or downright banned from existence. This chaos can 
help explain why both the civil society and liberal democracy classification from 1995-2005 are 
lower compared to the ones from 2005-2015.   
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Future researchers might find it advisable to limit their consideration to 2005 and beyond. 
Before 2005, many eastern European countries were extremely unstable with wars and internal 
political unrest dominating their socio-political landscape. By limiting the study to only 2005 and 
onwards, this period of unrest could be avoided, and there would be a greater chance of isolating 
the two variables being studied. 
The next table shows classifications for Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia, in 
addition to Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. Given the official statuses of the countries, data for 
Serbia and Montenegro starts in 2006, and Kosovo in 2008. 
Table 3. Explaining variation in democratic outcomes according to civil society strength in 
Eastern Europe from 2005-2015.  
Country Civil Society Participation Liberal Democracy  
Croatia High Medium High 
Albania  Medium High Medium  
Serbia Medium High Medium 
Kosovo Medium Medium Low 
Bosnia Medium High Medium Low 
Macedonia Medium High Medium Low 
Montenegro  High Medium Low 
 
Table 3 also fails to provide a clear picture as to the relationship between civil society 
and liberal democracy. Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia all have a liberal democracy 
classification only one level below that of their civil society participation. Bosnia and Macedonia 
have two ranks between their civil society participation and liberal democracy classifications. 
Montenegro is the only country to have a difference in three ranks, with a “High” civil society 
participation score and a “Medium Low” liberal democracy score. 
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From the table, the two variables appear to have a very slight correlation, in that higher 
levels of civil society tend to correlate with higher levels of liberal democracy. However, this 
correlation is too weak to draw any substantiated conclusion from. Instead, the civil society 
index was broken down into sub-indices in order to gain a clearer picture of any potential causal 
mechanisms. The four civil society sub-indices are candidate selection, civil society organization 
consultation, civil society organization participatory environment, and women’s participation in 
civil society organizations. The results for the index breakdown are shown in Graph 1 below. 
 
Graph 1. Civil society sub-indices from 1995-2015.  
Of the four sub-indices for civil society, the civil society participatory environment 
showed the highest averaged correlation with liberal democracy while candidate selection 
averaged the lowest. The civil society participatory environment measures the extent to which 
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civil society organizations can function independently from the government, as well as how high 
voluntary and popular participation is amongst citizens. Candidate selection measures how 
centralized legislative candidate selection is within parties. The sub-index looks at whether 
candidate selection is done at the local, state, or national party level. The breakdown for these 
high and low civil society sub-index correlations with liberal democracy are found in the Table 4 
below. Listed are the country values for each of the sub-indices. The values are averaged over a 
20 year range from 1995-2015. 
Table 4. Civil Society sub-index correlations with liberal democracy 1995-2015.  
Country Civil Society Participatory Environment 
(Highest) 
Candidate Selection 
(Lowest) 
Serbia 0.91 0.09 
Kosovo 0.77 -0.60 
Albania 0.72 -0.70 
Croatia 0.64 0.84 
Bosnia 0.56 0.18 
Macedonia 0.12 0.53 
Montenegro NA NA 
 
The sub-indices for Montenegro are not available. This table shows the generally high 
correlation between civil society participatory environment and liberal democracy, and the 
generally low correlation between candidate selection and liberal democracy. This table shows 
that it is possible for certain aspects of civil society to effect democracy more than others. So, 
while the main civil society index did not show significant correlation, it is possible that it is 
instead the civil society participatory environment that matters more than some of the other sub-
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indices in promoting and maintaining liberal democracy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I attempted to quantitatively determine the effects of civil society 
participation on democratization. By making use of the V-dem dataset, I determined the 
correlation between democratization and civil society indices for multiple Eastern European 
countries. Based on the results, my analysis fails to confirm the experimental hypothesis with 
any predetermined degree of certainty. This means that after the tabular analysis there was not 
enough data to support the hypothesis that higher degrees of civil society participation lead to 
higher levels of liberal democracy. Looking at the sub-indices for civil society yields a slightly 
clearer picture of the effects. In particular, the comparison of these correlation coefficients shows 
that the only significant result indicated a slight positive relationship between the civil society 
participatory environment and liberal democracy. The civil society participatory environment 
shows the level to which civil society organizations function independently and have popular 
participation. This relationship could be potentially caused by the ability of such organizations to 
hold the government accountable with their own version of a popular mandate via their 
membership. It could also be due to the organizational capacity of such organizations to mobilize 
in the event of an action against democratic norms.  
There are some limitations of this study that need to be addressed. To increase the 
predictive capabilities of this study, more controls for the economic and political conditions of 
the studied Eastern European countries are needed. Additionally, methodological concerns limit 
the quantitative scope of my investigation. Both the studied countries and the considered time 
period could be expanded or contracted in order to yield more definitive results.  In addition, 
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building a valid multivariate logistic regression model, which considers some combination of the 
civil society indices, could be more useful than analyzing each individually, especially when 
trying to isolate which sub-indices of civil society participation are most important in predicting 
democratic outcomes.  
As partially mentioned above, there are multiple extensions to this project that could lead 
to more definitive results. Expanding the project to both other Eastern European countries and 
former USSR states outside of Eastern Europe would allow for more a more extensive 
quantitative study. This extension would be particularly relevant, as many of these states 
developed democratic institutions at similar times to the Eastern European countries already 
covered in this study. Comparing and analyzing civil society and democratization indices of 
South American countries could also prove insightful as many Latin and South American 
countries also face the issue of democratic backsliding.  
Interpreting the results as a rebuke of the democratic institutionalizing capabilities of civil 
society is unadvisable. Much of the current literature in the field of comparative politics supports 
models of civil society as a stabilizing factor for young democracies. However, this article shows 
that this relationship might not be true in the case in former Yugoslavian countries. This study is 
a good starting point for developing more quantitative models to better test these relationships. 
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